



Caught in the Crossfire: Arresting Gang Violence By Investing in Kids

A Report from
FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS, is a national, bipartisan, nonprofit anti-crime organization. The national organization has a membership of more than 2,000 police chiefs, sheriffs, prosecutors and victims of violence. The members take a hard-nosed look at what works—and what doesn't work—to prevent crime and violence. They then recommend effective strategies to state and national policymakers.

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A Call for Action From Law Enforcement

The images are haunting, fathers and mothers grieving as they bury their sons and daughters because of gang violence. Mourning relatives at funerals and candlelight community vigils fill our television screens and newspaper front pages. Gang violence in America is once again on the rise. Nationwide gang homicides are up an alarming 50 percent since 1999. Serious violent criminals need to be arrested, convicted and locked up. But in order to curb gang violence we must find ways to intervene and offer alternatives to the gang lifestyle in order to save at-risk children before it's too late.

The police chiefs, sheriffs, prosecutors and crime survivors who make up FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS are committed to taking the most dangerous criminals off our streets; however, we also know that we can't simply arrest our way out of the crime problem. This report proves that the "one-two punch" of targeted police enforcement and intensive intervention with children yields dramatic results in cutting gang crime.

Research shows there are proven strategies to cut gang-related homicides almost immediately and shut off the pipeline that delivers new children into gangs. Successful model programs, such as ones in Philadelphia and Boston, start by locating youth gang members. The programs combine close supervision and swift consequences for violence with collaborative community services to help children get off drugs, stay in school, or find a job. In Philadelphia, statistics show that when their model program was instituted in two police districts in 1999, youth homicides dropped nearly in half for the following four years.

Another effective strategy steers kids from crime by equipping parents with tools to better manage their children's behavior and keep them on the right track. Other strategies focus on getting a head start by offering quality pre-kindergarten and home visitation/parent coaching programs.

The inner cities are no longer the exclusive domain of gangs and their violence. They have moved into many suburbs and small towns. To deal with this growing problem, communities throughout the nation are rallying to stem the tide with support across the political spectrum and from law enforcement, religious, social service and other civic leaders. However, funding to replicate successful intervention programs is not nearly adequate. Worse, the federal dollars we have relied on in the past continue to be threatened.

Since 2002, Congress has reduced juvenile justice funding by 44 percent. As I write this introduction, our lawmakers are considering another 40 percent cut. If they continue down this path, many successful anti-gang programs will be forced to discontinue services, raising the risk of more violence and higher taxes to pay for criminal justice and prison costs. And sadly, more children will be caught in the crossfire.

Let's not sacrifice another life or another neighborhood. America's law enforcement leaders call on policy makers to invest in successful gang prevention strategies, so we can stop this deadly menace and bring peace and safety back to our communities.

William Bratton
Los Angeles Police Chief

Executive Summary

Caught in the Crossfire: Arresting Gang Violence By Investing in Kids

Youth gang-related homicides in the United States are up 50 percent since 1999. Gangs and their violence are also spreading out to many suburbs, smaller cities and rural towns.

The law enforcement leaders and crime victim members of FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS are committed to taking dangerous criminals off the streets. But filling our jails with every gang member who can be identified will not solve the problem of gang violence.

There are three proven steps that can reduce gang-related homicides, violence and crime. The first step is to build on the successful model followed in at least three cities. These cities created collaborative efforts of law enforcement, street mentors, and community leaders to intervene and steer their most dangerous youths away from violence and back into school or a job. The next step is to provide proven programs that help families keep other seriously delinquent youths from joining gangs and ending up in prison. Finally, it is crucial to reach at-risk kids as early as possible to ensure they never become criminals in the first place.

Step 1. What works with gangs now

Boston, Philadelphia, and Baton Rouge have rapidly reduced violent crime by gang members and other troubled youths. After Boston adopted its collaborative anti-gang effort citywide, youth homicides dropped by two-thirds. In the two Philadelphia police districts where the Philadelphia collaborative approach was first implemented, youth homicides dropped twice as fast as in the rest of Philadelphia. And in Baton Rouge, youths in the program had one-fifth as many new violent offenses as similar youths not yet served by the program.

How did they do it? These successful programs start by identifying the few gang members and other youths in their neighborhoods most likely to kill someone or to be killed themselves. Each of these programs creates a collaborative effort to intervene with these high-risk youths and:

Send a clear message that violence will no longer be tolerated: Police, probation officers, religious leaders and other community leaders work together to maintain intensive supervision of these high-risk youths and ensure that any future gang violence is met with swift and sure consequences.

Provide intensive support and services to keep these high-risk youths out of trouble: High-risk youths and their families are required to connect with services that will help these youths keep away from drugs, stay in school, or get a job. Street-wise mentors do the intensive

outreach to ensure that these youths get the support and services they need to stay out of gangs and trouble.

The goal is not just to lock these youths up. In Boston, David Kennedy, who helped design that city's Operation Ceasefire, explained that they "used enforcement as sparingly as possible, and combined it with services and the moral voice of the community."

Shutting off the pipeline that delivers new kids into gangs

Communities also need to employ the effective programs that keep kids from either committing more gang-related crimes, or from ever turning to crime in the first place:

Step 2. Help for already troubled youths:

Three well-researched programs work with serious and violent juvenile offenders who may not yet be identified as gang members. The programs systematically provide the parents or foster parents of these youths with effective tools to better control their children's behaviors. Research shows that new arrests of youths in these programs have been cut by as much as half compared to youths not receiving this help. Because of the sharp drops in new crimes, net savings to taxpayers ranged from \$14,000 to \$31,000 for every youth placed in these programs.

Step 3. Start early to help at-risk kids succeed and stay away from crime:

After-school programs and anti-bullying programs can protect kids from gang violence and remove some of the pressures they face to join gangs. Voluntary high-quality home visitation programs for new parents and high-quality pre-kindergarten programs for at-risk kids have also been shown to help kids succeed in school and to cut future crime in half or more. The high-quality home visitation and pre-kindergarten programs save taxpayers three to four times what the programs cost.

A message from law enforcement leaders and crime victims

Instead of cutting funding for approaches proven to prevent crime and reduce gang violence, the over 2,000 law enforcement and crime victim members of FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS urge policy makers to fully fund these comprehensive anti-gang solutions. These wise investments are needed now to protect our communities from gang violence.

When Boston provided gang members with greater supervision, support, and services, youth homicides in that city dropped by two-thirds. Now, Philadelphia and Baton Rouge are proving this approach also saves lives in their cities.

Gang Homicides Are Up Over 50 Percent

Youth-gang related homicides have risen by more than 50 percent according to Professor James Alan Fox, a leading criminologist at Northeastern University. Gang homicides have climbed from 692 in 1999 to over 1,100 in 2002, the latest year for which data is available.¹ Gang-related homicides account for approximately half of all homicides in Chicago,² the city that had the highest total number of homicides of any city in the country in 2003.³ Gang-related homicides also account for approximately half of all homicides in Los Angeles, which led the nation in total homicides the year before (2002).⁴

Gangs are also responsible for the lion's share of juvenile delinquency in smaller cities. A study of troubled youth in Rochester, New York showed that gang members accounted for 68 percent of all the violent acts of delinquency among the youths studied in that city. In Denver, a similar study showed that gang members were responsible for 79 percent of the serious violence committed by that city's youths.⁵

The spread of gangs

Los Angeles and Chicago have long been infamous for their traditional gangs: the Crips and Bloods in LA and the Black Gangster Disciples, Latin Kings and Vice Lords in Chicago. But gangs are spreading rapidly throughout the country. According to criminologist Terrence Thornberry, "in the space of about 10 years, gangs have spread from a


relatively small number of cities to being a regular feature of the urban landscape."⁶ The latest Department of Justice funded National Youth Gang Survey in 2003 confirms that all large cities with populations over 250,000 report having gang activity, as do 87 percent of cities with between 100,000 and 250,000 people. However, gangs are not just in cities: 38 percent of suburban counties and 12 percent of rural counties report gang activity as well.⁷

Former Commander Wayne Wiberg of Chicago's narcotics unit explained that gang members are now appearing in smaller cities and towns throughout Illinois. These towns have "not just people living there who are using drugs, but people living there that are selling."⁸

The development and types of gangs

Youth gangs have been around for a long time. In the early 19th century, youth gangs were primarily Irish, Jewish, and Italian when many members of those immigrant groups lived in economically deprived neighborhoods and endured ethnic or religious discrimination.⁹ According to the most recent National Youth Gang Survey, nearly half of all gang members are Hispanic and a third are African American.¹⁰ The most recent gangs forming in smaller cities and suburbs in the 1990s, however, are more likely to be mixed ethnically, and involve female, white, and middle-class youths.¹¹ Gangs vary tremendously, but it is helpful to think in terms

Gang Activity Has Spread to Many Urban, Suburban, and Even Rural Areas



of three different categories: traditional gangs; more recent crews, cliques, or posses; and gangs forming in smaller cities, rural areas, and suburbs during the 1990s.

Traditional gangs

The gangs forming before the mid-1980s tended to fit the traditional definition of gangs. They began defending turf but often evolved into very large organizations that became more involved in drug sales and other criminal activity. Automatic weapons and drive-by shootings replaced the fists, chains and knives used in earlier gang violence. While the average size of traditional gangs is about 180 members,¹² a few of these gangs number in the thousand and even tens of thousands¹³ and have formed very elaborate structures and rules similar in many ways to the Mafia. Some gangs, such as the Crips and the Bloods from Los Angeles attempted to set up chapters in other cities.¹⁴ However, most expansion of gangs was homegrown or due to members simply moving to other cities, rather than a more concerted franchising effort.¹⁵

More recent crews, cliques, or posses

Many cities, like Washington D.C. and

Philadelphia, have relatively few of the larger, more traditional gangs, and instead have more loosely structured neighborhood “crews”, “cliques”, or “posses”.¹⁶ These small drug or neighborhood gangs often number only 25 members,¹⁷ and there is less gang graffiti, hand signs, and “colors” associated with these groups. Still “Live by the neighborhood, die by the neighborhood”¹⁸ is a common sentiment for these smaller gangs. These neighborhood gangs that often formed during the early 1980s are the most likely of any of the three categories of gangs to be involved in drug sales.

Gangs forming in smaller cities, rural areas, and the suburbs during the 1990s

Compared to the more traditional gangs and the crews, cliques, or posses that formed in the 1980s, the newer gangs forming in smaller cities, rural areas, and the suburbs beginning in the 1990s tend to be less involved in both drug sales and violence.²¹ As mentioned above, these newer gangs are often more diverse, and more likely to have white, female, and even middle-class members. Some of these gangs are small collections of youths that take on ominous names similar to traditional gangs

Drug Gangs Near the Capitol

National attention was drawn recently to another outbreak of drug-gang violence in Washington D.C. when a young girl, Princess Hansen, was murdered because she had witnessed one of the frequent murders in her neighborhood. Back in the 1960s, the Catholic Church helped found the Sursum Corda low-income community where Princess lived. Sursum Corda is Latin for “lift up your hearts.” But the community has become so violent that the last nuns living and working in the neighborhood moved out years ago.¹⁹ The Washington Post reports that “the illicit drug trade at Sursum Corda is controlled by two or three loosely knit gangs primarily made up of dealers ranging in age from 14 to 17, many of whom live in the complex, according to D.C. police.”²⁰ Sursum Corda is a few blocks from the Capitol building and though most Washingtonians have no idea exactly where it is, thousands of government and Congressional employees drive right by it on their way home at night.

and are involved in graffiti, etc., but may not be especially violent or heavily involved in drug sales. Nevertheless the difference between some of these newer gangs and other earlier gangs may not be that great, and parents, the police, and communities need to be vigilant. These newer gangs may become more dangerous over time. There are also very violent inner-city drug gangs or more traditional-style gangs, such as the El Salvadoran dominated MS-13,²² whose members are moving into the older, close-in suburbs near many cities.²³

Gangs, Crime Trends, and Costs

From a peak in the early 1990s, violent crime and homicide rates have dropped dramatically. But there is no room for Americans to become complacent. Violent crime in America is still at unacceptable levels: in 2001 over 16,000 Americans lost their lives to violence.²⁴ And in 2002, homicides were up over two percent and then again another one percent for the first six months of 2003 (the latest available national figures).²⁵ When crime last began to spike upwards in the late 1980s and early 1990s cities with more than one million people were the first cities to see crime go up and then the first to see it come down. So it is alarming that homicides were heading up almost six percent in those largest cities for the first six months of 2003.²⁶ And certainly the sharp increase in

youth-gang related homicides is a related and especially ominous trend.

Crime costs Americans \$655 billion a year. Most of that cost is borne by the millions of victims, but Americans also pay \$90 billion a year in taxes for criminal justice system expenses and an additional \$65 billion a year in total private security costs.²⁷ The taxes and private security payments alone average \$535 dollars a year for every man, woman and child in America.²⁸ That is over \$2,000 for a family of four even if no one in that family becomes a victim of the more than 23 million crimes committed each year in the United States.²⁹ In a 1998 study, Professor Mark A. Cohen of Vanderbilt University looked at the cost issue from another perspective. He found that preventing one teen from adopting a life of crime would save the country between \$1.7 million and \$2.3 million.³⁰ The Department of Justice reports that “if the 2001 rates of incarceration were to continue indefinitely” a white male in the United States would have a 1 in 17 chance of going to state or federal prison

“each high risk juvenile prevented from adopting a life of crime could save the country between \$1.7 million and 2.3 million”



Damian Corrente

“My son was not in a gang. He was a pre-med student with a bright future living on Long Island when a gang member murdered him. If you think we can afford to ignore gang violence, look at me, look at the picture of my beautiful son ... and think again.”

Pamela Corrente

during his lifetime, a Hispanic male would have a 1 in 6 chance and a black male would have a 1 in 3 chance of going to prison.³¹ However one looks at it – the more than 16,000 homicides a year, the millions of young men and women who will be imprisoned, or the shattered lives of the survivors of crime – crime and violence continue to challenge the very soul of America.

Real hope for reducing the toll of gang violence

After years of contentious debate about whether to be tougher or more compassionate with criminals, a consensus is beginning to

emerge in some communities. The consensus is based on a combination of research, hard experience gained from those in closest contact with these troubled youths, and a willingness by policy-makers to leave ideological suppositions behind to adopt tested, proven solutions. Law enforcement leaders are often leading this change. The real solutions are to be found in becoming smarter about crime, which requires new policies that are both tough and compassionate. If the right policies are followed, the huge costs and the lives lost because of violent crime can be sharply reduced.

Step One: New Learning on What Works With Gangs Now

The National Youth Gang Center, funded by the Department of Justice, did a national assessment of youth gang problems and programs. The Center developed a flexible approach for responding to gang problems at the community level based on what is working in many places to reduce gang violence. It calls for forming a collaborative effort providing closer supervision with swift sanctions if necessary, increased services, and greater community support for the most troubled youths in each community.³²

What does this mean in practice? Three cities – Boston, Philadelphia, and Baton Rouge – have shown that this collaborative approach can work.

A Tale of Three Cities

The “Boston Miracle”

When David Kennedy and his colleagues at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government carefully studied violence in Boston they discovered that:

Even in dangerous neighborhoods, only a tiny minority fewer than one percent of the juveniles and young adults were caught up in the violence. They were largely chronic offenders with robust criminal histories: Seventy-five percent of victims and offenders had prior arrests (on average, 10). ... They were involved in drug dealing street groups and enmeshed in shooting disputes with

other chronic offenders. Most of the violence was not about the drug business, but about respect, boy/girl matters and standing vendettas, the origins of which were unclear even to the participants.³³


With initial help from Department of Justice funding, Boston developed a collaborative approach called Operation Ceasefire. The collaborative effort used street mentors and probation officers who knew the gangs well to bring gang members together for meetings. At these meetings, religious leaders, local and federal law enforcement leaders, the street mentors and community groups delivered two clear messages to the gang members:

First: “The streets are going to be made safe again: the violence stops today; if someone in your group commits a violent crime, sanctions – from strict probation supervision up to federal drug enforcement – will be focused [not only on that person, but also] on the group’s other members.”³⁴

Second: “If you want help job training, drug treatment and so on we’re offering it.”³⁵

By building a comprehensive team made up of police, prosecutors, probation officers, street-mentors, religious leaders, social service agencies, and the broader community, Operation Ceasefire was able to keep a very

Youth Homicides in Boston Declined 63 Percent After Operation Ceasefire Began



National Institute of Justice

close watch on these few high-risk youths to ensure they did not engage in gang violence. The street mentors and community leaders also urged the gang members to take advantage of the services offered them. Unlike wide sweeps of gangs or drug markets, which have often been ineffective,³⁶ the goal was not to lock up as many gang members as possible for as long as possible. Operation Ceasefire made strategic use of sanctions. As noted earlier, David Kennedy explained that Operation Ceasefire “used enforcement as sparingly as possible, and combined it with services and the moral voice of the community.”³⁷

Did it work? Boston’s youth homicide rate was high from 1992 until the summer of 1996 when Operation Ceasefire began. Then, Kennedy report, the homicide rate:

... plummeted, light-switch style: by the beginning of 1997, it was a new world on the streets. After adjusting for existing trends, youth homicide (victims ages 24 and under) went down by two-thirds; youth gun assaults by half; the city’s overall homicide rate went down by half.

Kennedy further explained that the

reductions in Boston were unprecedented. While other cities saw extraordinary crime reductions over a number of years, “Boston’s took only a couple of months.”³⁸

An analysis published by the Justice Department concluded that other possible explanations of efforts underway in Boston were not likely to have caused the dramatic changes. Those other efforts had been in place before Operation Ceasefire without producing such sharp results, and “youth homicide reduction associated with Operation Ceasefire was distinct when compared with youth homicide trends in most major U.S. and New England cities.”³⁹ Similar efforts citywide in Minneapolis, Stockton, California, and Greensboro, North Carolina also appear to have been successful.⁴⁰

Unfortunately, youth homicides rose again in Boston when, because of budget cuts and other organizational challenges, Operation Ceasefire died out—further evidence that it was the collaborative effort to respond to gang violence that was responsible for the sharp drop in homicides in 1997.⁴¹ These collaborative and intensive efforts require regular meetings,

increased funding and organizational staying power. As Northeastern University criminologist James Alan Fox said, "Some cities might think when crime is going down that it's OK to cut these things. I know it takes money. But you can pay for the programs now or pray for the victims later."⁴²

The Philadelphia Story

Philadelphia further confirms that this collaborative approach really works because it is being adopted in one police district at a time instead of citywide and is producing dramatic results in those districts. The collaborative effort of Philadelphia youth-service agencies and criminal justice agencies, known as the Youth Violence Reduction Partnership, launched in June of 1999. It is taking advantage of the lessons learned in Boston and other cities. A new report, *Alive at 25*, written by evaluator Wendy McClanahan of Public/Private Ventures (PPV), documents the collaboration's goal to "steer youth, ages 14 to 24 years old and at greatest risk of killing or being killed, toward productive lives."⁴³

Philadelphia's program is succeeding. Youth homicides plummeted after this approach was rolled out in the first two Philadelphia police districts to adopt the approach. Looking at ten years of data, youth homicides per month are down 46 percent in the 24th district. When the program was expanded to the 25th police district, youth homicides there dropped by 41 percent as well. These decreases were more than twice the rate at which youth homicides were falling citywide.⁴⁴ McClanahan's analysis shows it is unlikely that other crime prevention programs underway citywide, or other possible explanations such as unemployment trends, could account for the much greater decline in youth homicides in these two districts.⁴⁵ McClanahan believes the coordinated Philadelphia program is already saving lives.⁴⁶

The troubled youths in Philadelphia who typically are members of local drug gangs certainly had multiple risk factors in their lives and "more than two-thirds had been

incarcerated at some point."⁴⁷ When the evaluators interviewed 18 of these high-risk youths about violence in their lives, 15 told stories of violence perpetrated against them or friends and family, including:

- An uncle, who was a drug lord, was killed and his friends then retaliated by killing those responsible
- A father was killed after he stole a bag of marijuana
- A friend who got caught in the middle of someone else's fight was fatally shot
- A friend who got drunk at a parade, tried to steal someone's gold chain, and was shot and killed
- A grandfather who was shot and killed in his car
- A friend who was fatally shot in an alley for his leather jacket.

Some had themselves been shot at and seven admitted having carried guns, while:

- One participant told of finding his brother dead in the basement
- Another saw his father stab someone to death.

The evaluator of the program, McClanahan, explained, "under more traditional systems, young people can easily fall through the cracks because probation officers, police officers, community workers and other service providers rarely work together."⁴⁸ Too often the system ignores the continued involvement of these youths in neighborhood drug gangs and simply waits until someone is severely injured or killed. The youths are either the ones seriously injured or killed, or they end up spending increasingly longer periods of their lives imprisoned.

In Philadelphia, in the police districts where the collaboration is underway, drug gang members and other troubled youths fall through the cracks much less often than before the collaborative effort began. Probation

Youth Homicide Rates Dropped by 46 Percent When the 25th Police District in Philadelphia Implemented the "Alive at 25" Collaboration*

Youth homicide rate per year (ages 7-24) in the 25th district



*Calculation is based on non-rounded numbers

Public/Private Ventures data

officers travel with police officers to make sure the probation officers are safe when they meet with these high-risk youths in their homes or in the community. The police and the probation officers both check drug corners to make sure the participants in the program are not returning to their old drug gangs. McClanahan notes, "When participants break rules, probation officers can initiate an 'expedited punishment' process with swift and certain consequences."⁴⁹ This creates a situation where the youths are often no longer welcome by their neighborhood gangs on their old drug corners because of the increased attention they will generate – probably helping to save their lives.⁵⁰

Another critical link in this effort to keep the high-risk participants in the program safe is the street mentors. The street mentors are typically in their twenties or early thirties and usually grew up in the same police district. Many have credibility with the youths because they themselves have struggled with neighborhood gangs, drugs, crime and violence. As McLanahan reports, the street mentors:

visit and bond with the young people, serving as a friend and role model. They provide transportation to job interviews, organize trips and recreation, help with family problems and lend an ear when someone needs to talk. They know and reinforce the rules of each participant's probation but also serve as trusted

friends and confidantes. Street workers represent a critical bridge between the community and mainstream society – a support mechanism missing from many programs targeting high-risk youth.⁵¹

The street mentors attempt to meet with each youth in the program at least 24 times each month. The probation officers not only have formal meetings with each of the youths every week, but they try to see these youths three more times a week at their homes or out in the community. Due to the efforts of the probation officers and the street mentors "typically, 56 to 84 percent of participants are involved in some kind of positive support," according to McClanahan.⁵²

Turning around the lives of these gang youths at their age and with their criminal experiences is no easy task. The program's success can be measured not just in lower homicide statistics in these Philadelphia neighborhoods – as impressive as those are – but also in the daily struggle to build better lives. As one youth explained:

Working this [regular] job, I'm not making no money the way I used to make money hustling. On the corner I made five hundred a day ... a good day I could see a thousand to two thousand dollars, just standing there. Now, I'm making like two-something a week, you know, so I'm not living the way I used to live. But, it's kinda like a good feeling though, 'cause I know I'm not stealing

from nobody. I ain't gotta watch my back for the cops, other people that might wanna rob me...somebody might wanna drive by and shoot up the corner, stuff like that. So it's a good feeling knowing that I'm working a regular nine-to-five, earning money off the sweat of my brow. I feel like a regular citizen.⁵³

Baton Rouge, Keeping Gangs Away and Troubled Youths Alive

Thanks to Baton Rouge's collaborative effort to supervise and support youths in trouble – named Operation Eiger after a mountain that is difficult to climb – Baton Rouge will continue to be able to keep gangs from becoming established there. With initial Justice Department start-up funding, Baton Rouge began its collaborative process in 1997 by initially targeting youths with multiple offenses in the two zip codes in the city that accounted for more than two-thirds of the city's homicides.


The on-going efforts in Baton Rouge are similar in many ways to the efforts in Boston and Philadelphia. The Baton Rouge collaborative effort increases supervision and provides more certain and swifter consequences for further violence coupled with support and services that will help these troubled youths to turn their lives around.

Baton Rouge's effort to surround its troubled, gang-prone youths with supports and services is even more intense than in Boston or Philadelphia. The project targets each youth with a rigorous evaluation and develops a service plan. The plan also brings in the youth's parents and younger siblings so the cycle of crime between older and younger siblings can be disrupted.⁵⁴ Project staff coach parents on more effective parenting practices. The program also provides a number of services and support for the often-troubled families. For example, according to Yvonne Lewis Day, the program director, "If a mother's car isn't running, we find a church member who can help her get to

work so she can keep her job."⁵⁵ The program also focuses on providing adult mentors and tutors for the youths, and on ensuring the youths get involved in after-school activities and other positive practices. Not only has the program now expanded city-wide, but instead of intervening only with the most troubled youths – those who in the past averaged 5.5 offenses – the program now intervenes with youths after only their first offense.⁵⁶

An outside evaluation conducted by the COSMOS Corporation, an applied research and evaluation firm, compared youths in the program with a sample of youths with similar criminal histories who were not in the program. The evaluation showed that the youths in the program had about one-fifth as many new violent offenses (0.25 new violent offenses on average for those in the program vs. 1.15 for similar youths not in the program).⁵⁷

Because the program is so successful, Lewis Day reports that judges in Baton Rouge are



now more willing to rely on probation coupled with the program rather than sending youthful offenders to secure facilities. The judges know that the whole community will surround these youths and their families with the close supervision, support, and services they need to avoid recidivism.⁵⁸

Will this work in the cities confronting large gangs?

Can the approaches developed in Boston, Philadelphia, and Baton Rouge also be part of the solution for reducing gang homicides in large cities facing traditional gangs like Chicago and Los Angeles? There is sufficient reason to believe that the collaborative approach of combining tough enforcement with services and support for gang members can be very effective at reducing gang violence in those cities.

In 2003, new Los Angeles Police Chief William Bratton was able to rally police and community efforts in Los Angeles to reduce gang-related homicides in Los Angeles by 30 percent.⁵⁹ The tactics used included employing the COMPSTAT data-collection and mapping system to encourage more pro-active policing. That system allows the police to track gang activity and other crime sources more accurately and respond with closely targeted enforcement efforts. John Mack, the president of the Los Angeles Urban League said that this will “be surgical and not a return to ... profiling every African-American guy on the street.”⁶⁰ Chief Bratton is also experimenting with using surveillance cameras in high-risk areas,⁶¹ and more intensive supervision of new parolees.⁶² Finally Chief Bratton is attacking large gangs with racketeering investigations as was done with the Mafia when he was commissioner in New York.⁶³

In Chicago, the new Police Superintendent Philip J. Cline is also achieving initial success in reducing homicides by focusing on gangs using many similar law enforcement tactics as those employed in Los Angeles. Cline has developed a high-tech deployment operations center that

allows his department to integrate intelligence from the field with computer mapping and deployment decisions. Cline is getting administrators out from behind desks part-time to help increase patrols in drug gang areas, and he is also deploying very-high-tech cameras in more-dangerous neighborhoods that can detect a gun-shot and zoom in to collect valuable information. Anecdotal reports are coming in that gang members are either giving up or moving elsewhere.⁶⁴

Boston, Philadelphia, and Baton Rouge also certainly relied on better tracking of high-risk violent youths with increased supervision and sanctions when necessary. But those city programs also developed extensive collaborative approaches ensuring that, along with the heightened supervision, the youths received the increased support and services they needed to turn away from crime. Wendy McClanahan, the evaluator of the program in Philadelphia, is convinced this collaborative approach can help cut gang violence in other cities too. After all, she points out, Philadelphia is a large city with overall homicide rates similar to or higher than Chicago and Los Angeles.⁶⁵

In fact, an initial effort to develop and study the collaborative approach between law enforcement and social services was implemented in Chicago in the Little Villages program. Administered by the Chicago Police Department, the initiative utilized street mentors and other strategies similar to the previously discussed models. It produced impressive results, including a 60 percent greater reduction in arrests among the most seriously violent targeted youth in the Little Villages neighborhood compared to similar youth who did not receive the program. However, the project faced formidable budget and organizational challenges, reinforcing the point that the emerging approach can be difficult to sustain.⁶⁶

In Los Angeles the RAND corporation replicated and studied the Boston model in the Hollenbeck area of Los Angeles for six months.

Their replication also highlighted the need for regular budget support and sufficient time to develop all the components of the intervention to be fully successful. Nevertheless, a report by RAND concluded that “in the aftermath of the intervention, violent and gang crime did decrease in the targeted area.”⁶⁷

Similarly, Gary Slutkin of the Chicago Project for Violence Prevention runs an ongoing program in Chicago, titled CeaseFire. The program pays close attention to the Boston experience as it focuses on reducing gang-related homicides in Chicago. In West Garfield Park, where CeaseFire has operated the longest, the program has helped reduce homicides by 67 percent in two years. However, in general, the overall initiative’s collaboration between law enforcement and communities is less intense than in the three cities profiled.⁶⁸

Each of these programs in Chicago and Los Angeles met with important successes, and each provide important lessons for implementing comprehensive and sustainable efforts in the future. McClanahan in Philadelphia, Lewis-Day in Baton Rouge, and Kennedy in Boston are convinced the collaborative approach as it has evolved in their three cities can be an important part of anti-gang efforts in large and small cities alike. The experience with collaboration in these three cities also shows that, if the collaborative approach cannot be adopted citywide as it was in Boston, it can be successfully phased in as Philadelphia is doing and Baton Rouge has already done.⁶⁹

“The street mentors in Philadelphia are currently funded by JABG [Juvenile Accountability Block Grant] funds, but the JABG funding stream is once again under attack in Washington and may even be eliminated.”

Funding is crucial

Many law enforcement and social service agencies are facing budget cutbacks and law enforcement is stretched thin by the need to allocate increased resources to Homeland Security. To implement these successful new anti-gang measures will require a greater show of political will at the federal, state and local levels. The federal government, in particular, has a critical role to play in disseminating more information to cities on how they can adopt successful programs and in assisting them with critical funding. Yet, even the administrators of the proven collaborative program in Philadelphia are currently holding up expansion plans of the \$4.7 million program until funding from the Department of Justice’s Juvenile Accountability Block Grant (JABG) is more secure.⁷⁰ The street mentors in Philadelphia are currently funded by JABG funds,⁷¹ but the JABG funding stream is once again under attack in Washington and may even be eliminated.⁷²

Step Two: Keeping Troubled Youths Out of Gangs

James Howell, a leading researcher and author on gangs at the National Gang Center, reports that communities “can control and reduce gang problems by targeting serious, violent, and chronic juvenile offenders who may not necessarily be known gang members.”⁷³

Most states and localities are desperate for better options on how to respond to youths in gangs. Currently, many communities may have only two real options: locking up youths in juvenile facilities or putting these troubled youths back on the street with little or no close supervision. That often ensures that the local police and judges will see these same youth again – after more people are hurt. In other localities, while there may be a range of intermediate sanctions that offer both increased supervision and services to these youths, too often those local sanctions are not designed using solid theory or evidence about what practices are proven most effective. Therefore, they are frequently much less successful than they could be in preventing recidivism. Here are three approaches that have been shown to effectively reduce recidivism by turning youths away from a life of gang violence and crime. Because they work to keep the public safe from gangs and violence and they keep these youths out of prison, the programs also save a lot of money.


[A short, effective intervention for the families of chronic juvenile offenders](#)

Functional Family Therapy (FFT) is a short family-focused intervention of as little as eight hours and as long as 30 hours that teaches families to better control their children’s behaviors. Convincing families that change is both necessary and possible, professionals start with a number of concrete techniques for the whole family to communicate their needs and wishes more effectively. They then coach parents on proven ways to monitor and control their children’s behaviors. Next, the staff members guide families to practice these new family management tools. Finally, the staff move to connect these troubled families with other resources in their communities – friends, family, government agencies and community or faith-based organizations – to support them as they make continued progress.

In Salt Lake City, families with troubled youths were randomly assigned to one group that received this intervention and one that did not. The youths whose families received family therapy were half as likely to be re-arrested as the youths whose families did not receive family therapy (26 percent vs. 50 percent). In a later study conducted in Sweden, those who were randomly assigned to receive family therapy were 37.5 percent less likely to be re-arrested than those who were randomly assigned to receive the usual social work assistance (50 percent vs. 80 percent). Another study, also conducted in Salt Lake City with random assignment, proved that the youths who received family therapy were one-fourth

Family Therapy (FFT) Cuts Re-arrests in Half

Percent of youths re-arrested



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as likely to be either incarcerated, in a psychiatric placement, or placed in foster care than those who received alternative therapeutic treatment (18 percent vs. 72 percent).⁷⁴

By reducing recidivism among juvenile offenders, family therapy easily pays for itself many times over. The Washington State Legislature asked its agency, the Washington State Institute for Public Policy, to examine the costs and benefits of various programs that prevented crime. The Institute team led by Steve Aos estimates that the average cost of the program is \$2,161 per participant, and family therapy produces a net return to taxpayers of \$14,149 for every participant by reducing crime and incarceration costs. When savings to crime victims are added in, the net savings climb to an amazing \$59,067 per participant. The total savings amount to over \$29 for every dollar spent.⁷⁵

For chronic, violent, or substance-abusing offenders, a more extensive program

Typically, Multi-Systemic Therapy (MST) is not available in the same areas as the family therapy program described above but where

possible they both should be provided because MST's more intensive family therapy is advisable for youths who have more severe and chronic problems with criminality. This intensive family therapy provides 60 hours of professional interventions over four months with the families of chronic juvenile offenders. The staff members are available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Though that is more intensive than the FFT family therapy described above, either of the programs can be used successfully for many of the same troubled youths.

The intensive family therapy professionals begin by determining the specific risk factors in each youth's environment such as associating with delinquent peers, drug or alcohol abuse, school failure, and ineffective parenting practices. Then the professionals strengthen the families directly by teaching parents more effective practices for controlling their children's behaviors. Next the program staff seek to develop a network of positive ties for the families with their school, recreation programs, other extended-family members and friends providing positive influences to further reinforce the new behaviors these troubled youths are learning.⁷⁶

Studies of the program have reported sharp reductions in re-arrests. One study in Simpsonville, South Carolina compared intensive family therapy to usual services (e.g., court ordered curfew, school attendance, referral to other community agencies) and found that intensive family therapy produced a 43 percent greater reduction in re-arrests. Another study in Columbia, Missouri, which compared graduates of intensive family therapy with graduates of more typical individual therapy for troubled youths, saw a 70 percent greater reduction in re-arrests for those in intensive family therapy.⁷⁷ However, research reveals that programs that are not carefully implemented and supervised will not produce significant, or even positive results. Because of that, intensive family therapy has become one of the most carefully replicated programs in

Intensive Family Therapy (MST) Graduates are One-third as Likely to be Re-arrested

Chronic juvenile offenders who graduated from intensive *family* therapy (MST) were one-third as likely to be re-arrested within four years as the graduates of *individual* therapy*

Percent of juvenile offenders re-arrested within 5 years



*The data on juvenile offenders re-arrested within five years that was reported in the *Blueprints for Violence Prevention* series are: MST graduates (n=77) 22% re-arrested; MST dropouts (n=15) 47%; Individual Therapy graduates (n=63) 71%; Individual Therapy dropouts (n=21) also 71%; those who refused any treatment (n=24) 88%.

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social services.⁷⁸

Based on the results of three evaluations of intensive family therapy, all with randomized samples, the Washington State Institute for Public Policy team estimated that the average cost of the program is \$4,743 per participant, with a net return to taxpayers of \$31,661 per participant. When the savings to crime victims are added in, the net savings climb to \$131,918 per participant. The total adds up to \$28 for every dollar spent.⁷⁹ Once again, it clearly pays to keep these youths from becoming career criminals.

What about serious offenders who cannot yet go back to their families?

Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC or simply treatment foster care) can take the place of group residential placement for many high-risk and chronic juvenile offenders. One or at most two youths are placed with special foster parents for six to 12 months. The treatment foster care professionals carefully recruit, train, and closely supervise foster families to ensure that they can manage and fundamentally alter the behaviors of these troubled youths. Along with close supervision at home, the program arranges for teachers to

quickly record the youths' behavior in their class each day on cards the students carry with them. Clear and consistent limits with meaningful consequences, such as removal of privileges, and positive reinforcement for appropriate behavior are provided. Initially the youths are constantly supervised. By demonstrating positive behaviors, however, the youths can gradually earn more rights to participate with acceptable peers and without constant supervision. The youths also receive individual therapy from the treatment foster care staff on how they can develop more positive ways to deal with their problems.⁸⁰

Meanwhile, the program trains the youths' biological parents or caretakers to maintain effective supervision of their children when they return home. After the youths are back home, staff members provide support to parents or caretakers as they establish clear limits on their children's behavior.⁸¹

One randomized evaluation that compared boys in a group home to boys in treatment foster care showed that the boys in foster care averaged half as many new arrests as the boys in group homes (2.6 arrests vs. 5.4 arrests). And six times as many boys in treatment foster care as boys in the group homes had successfully

Parent Training to Control the Behaviors of Troubled Youths Prevents Future Crime and Saves Money

	Cost of the program per participant	What the program saves taxpayers (from less crime) minus the costs per participant	What the program saves taxpayers & crime victims minus the costs per participant	Dollars saved by taxpayers and crime victims for every dollar invested
Functional Family Therapy	\$2,161	\$14,149	\$59,067	\$29 for every \$1 invested
Multisystemic Therapy	\$4,743	\$31,661	\$131,918	\$28 for every \$1 invested
Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care	\$2,052*	\$21,836	\$87,622	\$44 for every \$1 invested

*This is above the cost of the alternative, care in a group home, because foster care youths cannot be returned to their homes at this time.

Washington State Institute for Public Policy


avoided any new arrests (41 percent vs. 7 percent).⁸²

Such dramatic reductions in crime will easily pay for the program. AOS of the Washington State Institute for Public Policy analyzed the evaluations of treatment foster care and found great savings. Treatment foster care costs

\$2,052 more per youth than placement in a regular group home, yet the net savings to taxpayers from reduced crime equaled \$21,836. Adding in savings to crime victims brought the total savings to \$87,622. The total amounts to almost \$44 for every extra dollar spent compared to placing delinquents in typical group homes.⁸³

Boys in Foster Care with Specially Trained Foster Parents vs. Group Homes are One-sixth as Likely to Have any More Arrests

Percent of youths re-arrested at least once



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All three of these programs and the collaborative efforts to stop gang violence discussed earlier share a common commitment to strengthen the parenting of these troubled kids. Many, though by no means all, parents of troubled kids are themselves troubled. Being a parent is a hard job, especially today. So when given the right tools for the job, even parents who may not have made very good choices for themselves will better guide their children to make wise choices. The evidence is clear: coaching parents to be better parents can be an important part of the solution in helping troubled youths to change their ways.

Step Three: What Else Works to Shut-Off the Pipeline Delivering Kids Into Gangs?

Staying away from gangs in the after-school hours

The after-school hours (3 to 6 PM) are the prime time for juvenile crime⁸⁴ and gang-related crime⁸⁵ on school days. Moreover, unsupervised time spent with friends has also been shown to be a leading risk factor for joining gangs.⁸⁶

It is crucial for troubled and not-yet-troubled teens to secure adult mentoring relationships and to develop ties with more positive peers if they are going to stay out of trouble. That is why all these troubled youth programs discussed earlier in this report try to connect youths to supportive programs or activities during the after-school hours.

The Boys and Girls Clubs have proven that they can succeed in attracting and keeping troubled kids in their programs,⁸⁷ and the clubs can reduce vandalism by 50 percent and drug activity by 30 percent in the housing projects with clubs compared to those without.⁸⁸ An intensive after-school program for low-income high school students, called Quantum Opportunities, also dramatically cut crime. The program combined academics, personal development, community service, and monetary incentives to keep at-risk young people on a path leading to high school graduation and adult productivity. Six years later, compared to those in the program, boys left out averaged six times more criminal

convictions.⁸⁹

But too often good quality programs simply do not exist. Or if they do exist, the charges for the after-school program or the lesson fees for music and sports activities may be too expensive. Also, transportation to the programs may not be available. After-school programs often compete with the neighborhood corners that all too frequently offer excitement and money to disadvantaged teens. If the parents or other adults in the lives of at-risk youths are not available to supervise them, communities must make sure that there are high-quality programs available for youths during the after-school hours.

Bullying prevention programs can prevent gang violence too

Severe bullying at school can cause youths to turn to ethnic or other gangs for protection. Preventing bullying at schools becomes another important tool for preventing gangs. Successful anti-bullying programs also change the climate at schools, encouraging young people to report to school authorities that gang violence is about to occur – either at school or in the neighborhood. This early warning system allows school and other authorities to intervene before someone is hurt. FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS has addressed this important issue for preventing gangs in its 2003 publication of a report titled Bullying Prevention Is Crime Prevention.⁹⁰ A nationally

representative survey cited in that report found that bullying is uniformly widespread throughout urban, suburban, or rural schools.⁹¹

Children most commonly respond to bullying in one of two ways. Some internalize the torment – bullied boys are four times more likely to be suicidal than other boys, and bullied girls are eight times more likely to be suicidal.⁹² Others become bullies themselves. A national survey of America’s youth reports that six percent of youths in the sixth through tenth grades are both victims and bullies, which amounts to 2.2 million youths.⁹³ The survey also found that compared to those who were neither victims nor bullies, active bullies who torment others at least once a week and continue their bullying away from school are seven times more likely to report having carried a weapon to school in the last month.⁹⁴

The FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS report on bullying documents effective, relatively inexpensive programs that schools can adopt to reduce bullying and thus reduce student compulsion to join gangs for protection. These programs, which teach youths to reject being a

bystander, increase the chances that at least one student will report imminent gang and other school violence to authorities so that youths can be protected.⁹⁵ Anti-bullying programs typically suggest that schools set up a suggestion-style box or phone number where students can anonymously report incidents of bullying, threats, or weapon-carrying by other students. As Ken Slaby, the developer of one of the promising anti-bullying programs said, “The best metal detector in any school is another kid!”⁹⁶


Begin at the Beginning

In a column in The Washington Post, Marc Fisher discussed the gang-related killing of a young girl at the Sursum Corda housing project [see box above on page 6], and he reported that most of the younger brothers and sisters of the gang members as well as other neighborhood children are already far behind on their reading and math skills.⁹⁷ When these younger children grow up with few marketable skills and the lure of the drug trade beckons, will they be able to resist joining a gang? And should society wait to prevent gang violence until these children have already become heavily involved in criminal violence?

When a woman is pregnant, exposure to high levels of toxins such as alcohol can do permanent harm to the unborn child and even predispose a child to violence later in life.⁹⁸ Prenatal coaching of new mothers can reduce drug, alcohol, or even cigarette usage during pregnancy.⁹⁹ If an infant or toddler is severely neglected or abused, the bonds that will last a lifetime are not established and may never be fully established.¹⁰⁰ Research shows abused and neglected

Effect of Neglect on Brain Development

3 Year Old Children



These images are from studies conducted by a team of researchers from the ChildTrauma Academy in Houston, Texas led by Bruce D. Perry, M.D., Ph.D.

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children are much more likely to become criminals.¹⁰¹ Coaching for first-time parents can teach them effective techniques for coping with a crying child in ways that can prevent abuse. Almost all children learn from older siblings or peers how to violently take a toy from another child. But if young children do not learn by Kindergarten to use means other than violence to get what they want, they are at high risk of becoming involved in serious delinquency.¹⁰² Quality pre-kindergarten programs not only teach kids their ABC's and to count to ten, they carefully teach young children the means to get along with others and how to make friends – lessons that can last a lifetime.¹⁰¹

The most effective, most fiscally sound, and most humane time to prevent a child from becoming a gang member is at the beginning of a child's life. High-quality parent coaching through home visitation programs beginning prenatally, followed by high-quality pre-kindergarten programs, will help ensure that young children begin life heading in the right direction. With the right start, children can enter kindergarten well on their way to becoming happy, productive members of society, instead of starting kindergarten already troubled and behind and at risk of becoming the next generation's gang members.

The Nurse Family Partnership

The Nurse Family Partnership (NFP) randomly assigned half of a group of at-risk families to receive visits beginning during pregnancy and continuing until the child's second birthday by specially trained nurses. The nurses provided coaching in parenting skills and other advice and support. Rigorous studies then tracked the families until their children were age 15. The results proved that the mothers who were not in the program were three times more likely to have been arrested, and their children were almost five times more likely to have been victims of abuse or neglect. In addition, the children not in the program were twice as likely to have been arrested by age 15.¹⁰⁴

Coaching New Parents During Home Visits Cuts Children's Arrests in Half

Total arrests per 100 youths by age 15

45 per 100



At-risk children whose mothers did not receive parent coaching

20 per 100



At-risk children whose mothers received Nurse Family Partnership parent coaching

Journal of the American Medical Association

The RAND Corporation concluded that the NFP program serving new parents and their infants saves more than it costs by the time the children are just three years old. The program ultimately saves the government four dollars for every dollar invested. The figure does not even attempt to include the savings from reduced welfare costs and increased tax revenues when these children become productive adults, much less the benefits to the children themselves.¹⁰⁵

The Chicago Child-Parent Centers

Chicago's federally-funded Child-Parent Centers are high-quality pre-kindergarten programs that have served over 100,000 three- and four-year-olds since 1967. A study of 989 program children and 550 comparable non-program children shows that children from low-income neighborhoods who were excluded from the program were 70 percent more likely to be arrested for a violent crime by age 18 than the children who attended the program.¹⁰⁶ The program will prevent an estimated 33,000 crimes by the time the children who have attended the program reach age 18.¹⁰⁷


A cost-benefit study of the Chicago Child-Parent Center program showed it saved taxpayers, victims, and participants more than \$7 for every \$1 invested. For the children already served, the calculation translates into a savings of approximately \$2.6 billion.¹⁰⁸

The High Scope/Perry Preschool Program

Michigan's High/Scope Perry Preschool program served three- and four-year-old children from low-income families. Rigorous research has found that children who were not in the program were five times more likely to become chronic lawbreakers as adults than those who were in the program.¹⁰⁹

The High/Scope Perry Preschool Program cut crime, welfare, and other costs so much that it saved more than \$7 (including more than \$6 in crime savings) for every \$1 invested. These savings counted only the benefits to the public at large – in taxes paid when the preschoolers became adult workers and in reduced costs of crime, welfare, and remedial education. The figures do not take into account participants' increased earnings or the increased contribution to economic development those earnings represent.¹¹⁰

Dr. Steven Barnett, Director of the National



Institute for Early Education Research, estimated that the High/Scope Perry Preschool Program produced savings that exceeded \$70,000 per participant in crime-related savings alone, and \$88,000 once welfare, tax and other savings were included.¹¹¹

Conclusion

The more than 2,000 law enforcement leaders and crime survivor members of FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS know that America will never fully address its terrible crime and gang problems unless it becomes more proactive about stopping juvenile gang violence and preventing kids from growing up to be gang members in the first place.

When Mason-Dixon Polling and Research asked police chiefs, sheriffs and prosecutors nationwide which one of four strategies would have the greatest impact in reducing youth violence and crime, 71 percent chose providing more pre-kindergarten programs for pre-school age children and after-school programs for school-age children as the most effective strategy. A majority also favored hiring more police officers (15 percent picked hiring more police officers as the most effective strategy and 52 percent picked it as the second more effective strategy). However, the chiefs picked the investments in after-school and pre-kindergarten programs as “most effective” by a more than a four-to one margin even over hiring more police officers. Twelve percent chose prosecuting more juveniles as adults and two percent chose installing more metal detectors and surveillance cameras in schools as their top choice for the most effective way to prevent youth violence.¹¹²

Police Chiefs, Sheriffs and District Attorneys are well aware that law enforcement cannot solve the juvenile crime or gang violence

problems by themselves. The Major Cities Chiefs’ Organization, the Fraternal Order of Police, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National District Attorneys Association and the National Organization for Victim Assistance have all endorsed the call by FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS to invest now in what works to help at-risk kids avoid crime.

To stem growing gang violence, this report has shown that it is crucial to:

Invest in collaborative approaches that unite the efforts of street mentors, the broader community, probation officers and law enforcement officers. In Boston, Philadelphia, and Baton Rouge, these collaborative efforts have demonstrated they can reach the most at-risk, gang-prone juveniles before they are either killed or kill someone else. By increasing supervision, applying prompt sanctions if necessary, and also ensuring that these most at-risk youths have the support and services they need to change their lives, these programs have shown that committed communities can reduce gang violence.

Catch kids in trouble before they become full-fledged gang members. Well-tested interventions for the parents or foster parents of these troubled youths strengthen these families so the parents can effectively control the behaviors of their children and keep them from becoming life-long criminals.

Start early giving parents the support they need. In addition to effective after-school and anti-bullying programs, children need help as soon as possible to avoid gangs. With the assistance of parent coaches in home visitation programs for new parents and high-quality pre-kindergarten programs, young at-risk children can develop the social and cognitive skills they need to succeed in life and avoid prison.

There is no need to surrender more of our neighborhoods and children to gang violence. But it will take strong public will and adequate

funding in order to reap the tax savings and cascading benefits that come from safer communities. It is like dealing with a leaking roof on a house. We can repair water damage, or we can find the money to really deal with the problem and fix the hole in the roof. The law enforcement leaders and crime victims who make up FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS are committed to seeing that America adopts a successful, comprehensive approach to gang violence. Anything less will not adequately protect America's families.

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- ¹⁷ Klein, M. W., & Maxson, C. L. (1996). *Gang structures, crime patterns, and police responses. Unpublished report*. Los Angeles, CA: Social Science Research Institute, University of Southern California. Cited in Howell, J. C. (1998). *Youth gangs: An overview*. Retrieved from National Criminal Justice Reference Service Web Site: <http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org/jjbulletin/9808/contents.html>
- ¹⁸ Glover, A. Personal communication, October 17, 1997. The expressions is a lyric from a song by the Back Yard Band's lead singer, Anwon "Genghis" Glover, of Washington D.C. Glover was in Washington Hospital Center recovering from being shot during one of his performances when Bill Christeson spoke with him and his manager.
- ¹⁹ Kovaleski, S. F., & Fahrenthold, D. A. (2004, February 1). NW housing complex a tangle of drugs, despair. *The Washington Post*, p. A1.
- ²⁰ Kovaleski, S. F., & Fahrenthold, D. A. (2004, February 1). NW housing complex a tangle of drugs, despair. *The Washington Post*, p. A1.
- ²¹ Starbuck, D., Howell, J. C., & Lindquist, D. (2001). *Hybrid and other modern gangs*. Retrieved from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service Web site: http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/jjbul2001_12_1/contents.html
- ²² Howell, J. Personal communication, April 10, 2004. Howell reports that MS-13 is a subset of the larger Mara Salvatrucha gang. However, because this gang is known in the Washington, D.C. and New York area as MS-13 rather than by the name, Mara Salvatrucha, MS-13 is used in this report. For more information, Howell suggests: Valdez, A. (2000). *Gangs: A guide to understanding street gangs (3rd ed)*. San Clemente, CA: LawTech Publishing Co.
- ²³ Starbuck, D., Howell, J. C., & Lindquist, D. (2001). *Hybrid and other modern gangs*. Retrieved from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service Web site:

- http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/jjbul2001_12_1/contents.html. For specific reports of the MS-13 gang spreading to the suburbs of Washington, D.C., New York and Boston, see: Jackman, T. (2004, April 28). Man pleads guilty to gang recruitment; Crips faction sought VA members. *Washington Post*, p. B04; Crowley, K. (2004, April 24). Life for slay of "Angle" in L.I. drive-by. *New York Times*, p. 7; Sweet, L. J. (2004, April 24). Somerville cops watch gangs after teen's killing. *Boston Herald*, p. 009.
- ²⁴ Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2003). *Uniform crime report, 2002*. Retrieved from <http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/02cius.htm>
- ²⁵ Federal Bureau of Investigation. (n.d.). *Uniform crime report*. Retrieved from <http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm>. The figures are based on homicides reported for 2001, 2002 and the first half of 2003.
- ²⁶ Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2003). *Uniform crime reports, January-July 2003*. Retrieved from <http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/2003/03semimaps.pdf>. In cities with over one million people, homicide rates were up 5.7 percent in the first half of 2003.
- ²⁷ Welsh, B. C. (2003). Economic costs and benefits of primary prevention of delinquency and later offending: A review of the research. In D. P. Farrington & J. W. Coid (Eds.), *Early prevention of adult anti-social behavior* (pp. 318-356). London: Cambridge University Press.
- ²⁸ Welsh, B. C. (2003). Economic costs and benefits of primary prevention of delinquency and later offending: A review of the research. In D. P. Farrington & J. W. Coid (Eds.), *Early prevention of adult anti-social behavior* (pp. 318-356). London: Cambridge University Press. The cost per person (excluding crime victim costs) was computed by dividing the combined total cost of protection [annual cost of the annual taxes for the criminal justice system (\$90 billion) plus the annual expenditure for private security (\$65 billion)] by the total number of American civilians (n=289,558,274). For the number of American civilians, see: Population Division, US Census Bureau. (2004). *Table ST-EST2003-01civ - Annual estimates of the civilian population by selected age groups for the United States and States: July 1, 2003 and April 1, 2000*. Retrieved from <http://eire.census.gov/popest/data/states/ST-EST2003-01.php>
- ²⁹ Bureau of Justice Statistics. (2004). *Crime victimization*. Retrieved from <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cvictgen.htm>
- ³⁰ Cohen, M. A. (1998). The monetary value of saving a high-risk youth. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 14(1), 5-33.
- ³¹ Smith, S. (2003). *More than 5.6 million U.S. residents have served or are serving time in state or federal prisons*. Retrieved from the Bureau of Justice Statistics Web site: <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/piusp01pr.htm>
- ³² National Youth Gang Center. (n.d.). *Comprehensive gang model*. Retrieved from <http://www.iir.com/nygc/acgp/model.htm>. For more information on the National Youth Gang Center, see: <http://www.iir.com/nygc>. The model includes: 1) acknowledging the problem and conducting a careful community assessment of the local gang problem: where gangs are, how they operate, who's fighting whom, and who are the most at-risk youth that need services; 2) organizing the community to respond to these relatively few individuals in a collaborative effort with law enforcement personnel and social service providers; 3) developing new or utilizing existing education, training and employment programs; Developing the community capacity to connect troubled youth with the more conventional world and the services they will need to stay away from crime. This entails employing or mobilizing street mentors, youth agencies, schools, faith-based groups, and others to work closely with troubled youths and their families; 4) developing more effective formal and informal social control of these troubled youth. This includes closer supervision, with surer sanctions when necessary, by the police, schools, parents, community agencies and grassroots leaders who all send out the clear message that further violence will not be tolerated; and 5) building organizational capacity to sustain and improve on these collaborative efforts by the police; probation officers; street mentors; other government, non-profit, and faith-based agencies; and the broader community.
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- ³⁴ Kennedy, D. M. (1999, May 23). A look at reacting to violence, but Boston proves something can be done. *The Washington Post*, p. B3.
- ³⁵ Kennedy, D. M. (1999, May 23). A look at reacting to violence, but Boston proves something can be done. *The Washington Post*, p. B3.
- ³⁶ Klein, M. W., & Maxson, C. L. (1996). *Gang structures, crime patterns, and police responses*. Unpublished report. Los Angeles, CA: Social Science Research Institute, University of Southern California. Cited in Howell, J. C. (1998). Youth gangs: An overview. Retrieved from National Criminal Justice Reference Service Web Site: <http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org/jjbulletin/9808/contents.html>
- ³⁷ Kennedy, D. A. (2002, July 15). *We can make Boston safe again*. Retrieved from the Harvard University Web site: http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2002/kennedy_boston_violence_bg_071502.htm
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- ³⁹ Kennedy, D. M., Braga, A. A., Piehl, A. M., & Waring, E. J. (2001). *Reducing gun violence: The Boston gun project's Operation Ceasefire*. Retrieved from the National Institute of Justice Web site: <http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/188741.pdf>
- ⁴⁰ For Minnesota, see: Office of Juvenile Justice Delinquency. (n.d.) *Minnesota HEALS (Hope, Education, and Law and Safety) - Minneapolis and St. Paul, MN*. Retrieved from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service Web site: http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/pubs/gun_violence/profile07.html. "Since the Minnesota HEALS initiatives began, homicides declined 30 percent in Minneapolis (from 83 in 1996 to 58 in 1997) and the number of murders dropped from 40 in summer 1996 to 8 in summer 1997 — the lowest number of summer homicides in 12 years. Gang-related homicides dropped from 52 percent of all homicides to 23 percent from May 1997 to March 1998." Also, see: Associated Press. (2002, December 31). *Serious crime drops in Minneapolis and St. Paul*. Retrieved from LexisNexis. That article reported that gang-related homicides had increased again, but after anti-gang efforts were again renewed, the proportion of homicides related to gangs again declined. For Stockton see: Wakeling, S. (2003). *Ending gang homicide: Deterrence can work*. Retrieved from the Safe State Web site: <http://safestate.org/documents/local%20level%20.pdf>. A report from the California Attorney General's Office reports that Stockton "adopted the Ceasefire approach in 1997 and used it to reduce gang-related youth homicide by more than 75 percent." For Greensboro North Carolina, see: Kennedy, D. A. (2002, July 15). *We can make Boston safe again*. Retrieved from the Harvard University Web site: http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2002/kennedy_boston_violence_bg_071502.htm; Bell, R. Personal communication, April 4, 2004. Captain Rick Bell works for the Greensboro Police Department. Kennedy and Bell report that gun crimes were reduced by over 80 percent after a collaborative effort was instituted in Greensboro to target high-risk individuals.
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- 46 McClanahan, W. Personal communication, April 2, 2004. Wendy McClanahan is a program evaluation for Public/Private Ventures.
- 47 McClanahan, W. S. (In press). *Alive at 25: Reducing youth violence through monitoring and support*. Philadelphia, PA: Public/Private Ventures.
- 48 McClanahan, W. S. (In press). *Alive at 25: Reducing youth violence through monitoring and support*. Philadelphia, PA: Public/Private Ventures.
- 49 McClanahan, W. S. (In press). *Alive at 25: Reducing youth violence through monitoring and support*. Philadelphia, PA: Public/Private Ventures.
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- 53 McClanahan, W. S. (In press). *Alive at 25: Reducing youth violence through monitoring and support*. Philadelphia, PA: Public/Private Ventures.
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- 56 Day, Y. L., Personal communication, April 7, 2004.
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- 58 Day, Y. L. Personal communication, April 7, 2004.
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- 60 Butterfield, F. (2004, January 17). Rise in killings spurs new steps to fight gangs. *The New York Times*, p. A1. Also, see: Buntin, J. (2003). *Gangbuster*. Retrieved from the Governing Magazine Web site: <http://www.governing.com/articles/12gangs.htm>
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- 62 Kandel, J. (2004, March 2). Extra policing: LAPD senior lead officers must keep track of parolees. *The Daily News of Los Angeles*, p. N1.
- 63 Butterfield, F. (2004, January 17). Rise in killings spurs new steps to fight gangs. *The New York Times*, p. A1; Landsberg, M., & Mitchell, J. L. (2002, December 5). *In gangs' territory, a weary hope: The neighborhoods most affected by violence have heard it all before. Still, they are looking to Chief Bratton for action*. Retrieved from the Street Gangs Web site: <http://www.streetgangs.com/topics/2002/120502territory.html>
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- 65 Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2003). *Uniform crime report, 2002*. Retrieved from <http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/02cius.htm>. Homicide rates were determined by the following calculations by dividing the number of homicides by the population. For Los Angeles, $654/3,830,561=17/100,000$; for Chicago $648/2938299=22/100,000$; and for Philadelphia $288/1,524,226=19/100,000$.
- 66 Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority. (2000). *Combating gang violence in Chicago's Little Village neighborhood*. Retrieved from <http://www.icjia.state.il.us/public/pdf/oga/GVRP.pdf>
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- 74 Alexander, J., Pugh, C., Parsons, B., & Sexton, T. (2000). Family Functional Therapy. In D.S. Elliot (Series Ed.), *Blueprints for violence prevention: Book three*. Boulder, CO: Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence.
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- 76 Henggeler, S. W., Mihalic, S. F., Rone, L., Thomas, C., & Timmons-Mitchell, J. (1998). Multisystemic Therapy. In D.S. Elliot (Series Ed.), *Blueprints for violence prevention: Book six*. Boulder, CO: Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence.
- 77 Henggeler, S. W., Mihalic, S. F., Rone, L., Thomas, C., & Timmons-Mitchell, J. (1998). Multisystemic Therapy. In D.S. Elliot (Series Ed.), *Blueprints for violence prevention: Book six*. Boulder, CO: Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence.
- 78 Henggeler, S. W., Mihalic, S. F., Rone, L., Thomas, C., & Timmons-Mitchell, J. (1998). Multisystemic Therapy. In D.S. Elliot (Series Ed.), *Blueprints for violence prevention: Book six*. Boulder, CO: Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence. In discussions at a symposium there is apparently valid criticism that the earlier randomized trials of the Multi-Systemic Therapy program (MST) did not routinely report on all those randomized – it appears some of the studies reported on those treated rather than those intended to be treated. The available data published by Henggeler et al. indicates that there are strong results among those who did receive the treatment compared to those who received alternative services [see the graph on intensive family therapy]. Furthermore, the one study that the as yet unpublished meta-analysis focuses on as having been done most rigorously, and which does not show significantly positive results, ignores the data that shows that in the sites of that replication where the MST model was followed most faithfully the results are strong and where it was not, the results are weak (Henggeler, S. W. Personal communication, April 2, 2004). The same pattern of results was found in another randomized trial reported in Henggeler et al. above. As a result, MST has put procedures in place to ensure high fidelity to their program (Swenson, M. Personal communication, April 2, 2004. Marshall

- Swenson is the Manager of Program Development for MST Services.). The problem with fidelity to the model issue is not just for MST. Functional Family Therapy (FFT) has shown clearly in a study done by Barnoski that, for those recipients served by counselors in FFT who did not score high on quality of services, the intervention, on average, actually increases recidivism compared to an alternative program for these youths in Washington State that was used for comparison with FFT. However, those in FFT receiving treatment from practitioners who carefully follow the protocol achieved very strong results in terms of reduced recidivism compared to those receiving alternative services. Careful replication is therefore essential for all these programs to be effective, a conclusion that has been reached routinely in social services. MST still appears to be effective in reducing recidivism among serious juvenile offenders if it is replicated faithfully. For the symposium presentation, see: Farrington, D. P. (2004, February 23). *What have we learned from experiments in criminology? An update*. Paper presented at the Jerry Lee Symposium, Washington, DC. For the Barnoski study, see: Barnoski, R. (2004). *Outcome evaluation of Washington State's research-based programs for juvenile offenders*. Olympia, WA: Washington State Institute for Policy.
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- ⁸⁵ Wiebe, D. J., Meeker, J. D., & Vila, B. (1999). *The Orange County Gang Incident Tracking System: Hourly trends of gang crime incidents, 1995-1998*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
- ⁸⁶ Thornberry, T. P. (1998). Membership in youth gangs and involvement in serious and violent offending. In R. Loeber and D. P. Farrington (Eds.), *Serious and violent juvenile offenders: Risk factors and successful interventions* (pp. 147-166). London: Sage Publications.
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- ⁹¹ Nansel, T. R., Overpeck, M., Pilla, R. S., Ruan, W. J., Simons-Morton, B., & Scheidt, P. (2001). Bullying behaviors among US youth: Prevalence and association with psychosocial adjustment. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 285(16), 2094-2100.
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- ⁹⁴ Nansel, T. R., Overpeck, M., Pilla, R. S., Ruan, W. J., Simons-Morton, B., & Scheidt, P. (2001). Bullying behaviors among US youth: Prevalence and association with psychosocial adjustment. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 285(16), 2094-2100. Also, see: Olweus, D., & Limber, S. (1999). Bullying prevention program. In D. S. Elliott (Series Ed.), *Blueprints for violence prevention: Book nine*. Boulder, CO: Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence.
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- ⁹⁶ Slaby, R. Personal communication, August 1, 2003. Dr. Ron Slaby is the Senior Scientist at the Education Development Center and a lecturer at Harvard.
- ⁹⁷ Fisher, M. (2004, March 18). At Sursum Corda, hope battles a city's apathy. *The Washington Post*, p. B1.
- ⁹⁸ Perry, B. D. (2003). *Bonding and attachment in maltreated children: Consequences of emotional neglect in childhood*. Retrieved from The Scholastic website: <http://teacher.scholastic.com/professional/bruceperry/bonding.htm>; Perry, B. D. (2003). *Aggression and violence: The neurobiology of experience*. Retrieved from The Scholastic website: http://teacher.scholastic.com/professional/bruceperry/aggression_violence.htm
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- ¹⁰² Farrington, D. P., & Wikstrom, P.-O. H. (1994). Criminal careers in London and Stockholm: A cross-national comparative study. In E.

G. M. Weitekamp and H. J. Kerner (Eds.), *Cross-national longitudinal research on human development and criminal behavior* (pp. 65-89). Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers; Huesmann, L. R., Eron, L. D., Lefkowitz, M. M., & Walder, L. O. (1984). Stability of aggression over time and generations. *Developmental Psychology*, 20, 1120-1134; and White, J. L., Moffitt, T. E., Earls, F., Robins, L., & Silva, P. A. (1990). How early can we tell? Predictors of childhood conduct disorder and adolescent delinquency. *Criminology*, 28, 507-533. All cited in J. McCord, C. S. Widom, & N. A. Crowell (Eds.), (2001). *Juvenile crime, juvenile justice*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. According to the book, "The social behavior characteristics that best predict delinquent behavior are physical aggression and oppositionality. Kindergarten children who have not learned to use means other than aggression to get what they want are at high risk of being rejected by their peers, of failing in school, and eventually of getting involved in serious delinquency."

¹⁰³ One such program, the Incredible Years, has been used with Head Start programs in Seattle, Washington. Compared to children who did not receive the program, those in the Incredible Years had lower rates of anti-social behavior. Webster-Stratton, C., Reid, M. J., Hammond, M. (2001). Preventing conduct problems, promoting social competence: A parent and teacher training partnership in Head Start. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, 30(3), 283-302.

¹⁰⁴ For outcomes on the mothers in the program, see: Olds, D. L. (1997). Long-term effects of nurse home visitation on maternal life course and child abuse and neglect. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 278(8), 637-643. For outcomes on the children in the program, see: Olds, D. L. (1998). Long-term effects of nurse home visitation on children's criminal and anti-social behavior: 15-year follow-up of a randomized controlled trial. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 280(14), 1238-1244.

¹⁰⁵ Karoly, L. A., Greenwood, P. W., Everingham, S. S., Houbé, J., Kilburn, M. R., Rydell, C. P., Sanders, M., & Chiesa, J. (1998). *Investing in our children: What we know and don't know about the costs and benefits of early childhood interventions*. Retrieved from <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR898/>

¹⁰⁶ Reynolds, A. J., Temple, J. A., Robertson, D. L., & Mann, E. A. (2001). Long-term effects of an early childhood intervention on educational achievement and juvenile arrest. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 285(12), 2339-2380.

¹⁰⁷ Reynolds, A. J. (2001, February 9). *Chicago Child Parent Centers linked to juvenile crime prevention*. Speech given at Fight Crime: Invest in Kids press conference in Washington, DC.

¹⁰⁸ Reynolds, A. J., Temple, J. A., Robertson, D. L., & Mann, E. A. (2002). Age 21 cost-benefit analysis of the Title I Chicago Child-Parent Centers. *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis*, 24(4), 267-303.

¹⁰⁹ Schweinhart, L. J., Barnes, H. V., & Weikart, D. P. (1993). *Significant benefits: The High/Scope Perry Preschool study through age 27*. Ypsilanti, MI: High/Scope Press.

¹¹⁰ Schweinhart, L. J., Barnes, H. V., & Weikart, D. P. (1993). *Significant benefits: The High/Scope Perry Preschool study through age 27*. Ypsilanti, MI: High/Scope Press.

¹¹¹ Barnett, S. W. (1993). Cost benefit analysis. In L. J. Schweinhart, H. V. Barnes, & D. P. Weikart (Eds.), *Significant benefits: The High/Scope Perry Preschool study through age 27* (pp. 143-173). Ypsilanti, MI: High/Scope Press. The savings were found even after subtracting interest that could have been earned on the preschool investment while the High/Scope toddlers were growing up.

¹¹² Mason-Dixon Polling and Research. (2002, August). *National law enforcement leadership survey*. Retrieved from Fight Crime: Invest in Kids web site: <http://www.fightcrime.org/reports/nationalkid-spoll2002.pdf>



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